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Abstract
U nderstanding a text always dem ands knowledge of its 
context. Possible reasons why context is frequently  
regarded  as a subord inate  p art o f in te rp re ta tion  are 
analysed. Interpretation within a communicative pers­
pective, and facets o f contextualisation are  discussed; 
som e theoretical aspects concerning contextual issues 
are clarified. The notion ‘framing the text’ is defended 
to emphasise that history is constructed and always p re ­
supposes a perspective. Framing is a comprehensive ac­
tivity which adds complexity. Because it engages in his­
to r ica l in te rp re ta tio n  and  d escrib es  asp ec ts  o f the 
various levels of context, one’s fram ing activity can be 
criticised and im proved. Fram ing arises from oscilla­
tion  betw een intensive in te rp re ta tio n  of de ta ils  and 
generalisation.
1. INTRODUCTION
The appeal to context in m atters of dispute about meaning is a natural and obvious­
ly im portant feature of interpretation. The significance of context has been stressed 
by all disciplines engaged in interpretation. From  psychological research into hu­
man communicative behaviour and the phenom enon of meaning (e g Bransford &
* Revised version of a paper read al a subgroup m eeting of (he New T estam ent Society of South 
A frica held at U nisa on 27 Septem ber 1991. P ie ter C raffert provided some helpful references and 
H elen Botha some meaningful criticism, for which I thank them.
ISSN 0259 9422 -  UTS 49 /1 A 2 (1993) 29
‘Background studies’ and New Testament interpretation
Johnson 1972; Palerm o & Bourne 1978:160-173) to folklore studies (Ben-Amos 
1983; H onko 1984) the concept context is constantly stressed. This emphasis seems 
to be related to the very structure of knowledge and understanding: Something out­
side the ‘object’ is needed in o rder to know or to understand. The basic idea has 
been well expressed by Ong (1990:206):
...the notion of text, and its plasticity when subject to various forms of 
m ediated comm unication, is one...concept in need of m ore sensitive 
exam ination...an inscription is not fully a text until som eone reads it, 
that is, until som eone produces from the w riter’s text something non­
textual...To do this requires a code that the text itself does not pro­
vide. Texts, as texts, are dependent on something nontextual. All text 
is pretext. Unless som eone has this extra textual code which makes 
reading possible and applies the code, the physical inscription remains 
forever no more than a visible pattern on a surface.
T he indisputable and indispensable role of this nontextual ‘som ething ex tra ’, is 
usually referred to as context. However, context turns out to be a complex concept. 
It may be possible to clarify some of the problems by analysing aspects of the con­
cept context. A fter all, reflection on the conditions for understanding is very much 
part of the process itself.
M ore specifically, this study must be understood with reference to a clearly 
observable phenom enon in New T estam ent scholarship. T here is undoubtedly a 
strong emphasis on the importance of context in this field of study. A few examples, 
which can be m ultiplied alm ost indefinitely, are M artin (1977:220-222), R oberts 
(1978:63-64), M albon (1983:223), V orster (1984:111) and Botha (1991a: 280, 287; 
1991b: 296, 299). No one seriously denies the contribution an d /o r value of context. 
D espite the affirm ation, what exactly is m eant by context is left unclear: Why it is 
im portant -  in practice -  usually turns out to be a rhetorical move to prop up one’s 
interpretation. How context should be utilised for the proper interpretation of texts 
is seen as somehow a common sense activity.
South-African New T estam ent research has been assessed as having a distinct 
perspective -  alm ost an exclusive concern with literary and textual m atters (Elliott 
1988; cf a similar rem ark by Moore 1989:xiv n3). A motley array of reasons can pro­
bably be supplied, but this de facto  slighting of context appears to be related to, or 
rather, to be a symptom of a misconception of history. In a defense of a ‘histori- 
cized’ approach to reader response gospel criticism, Beavis (1987) has commented 
on the assumption that literary and historical criticism do not mix; a sentim ent that, 
disguised in various term inologies (synchrony/diachrony; tex t/ex tra-tex t etc), is 
quite common. Yet these are activities that presuppose each other, neither of these
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perspectives can legitim ately function w ithout the o ther. In a sense, it is a false 
dichotomy (see, for instance, De Beaugrande & Dressier 1981:6-12 on the coheren­
ce and other standards of textuality; W inner 1990:221; Zim a 1981:103).
I would like to argue that participating in historical activity, in a comprehensive, 
interpretive sense is more than of importance to New Testam ent research. It relates 
to the very essence of understanding. Construing a text is always also construing its 
context. To underscore the fact that context is construed, actively made by the inter­
preter, the notion of ‘framing a text’ will be developed. We frame texts on the basis 
of relevance -  consequently what we are and want to know are part and parcel of 
the ‘context’ of the text. That ‘framing’ implies an interplay with the various levels 
o f context as well as an active engagem ent in describing aspects o f these levels 
makes it possible to  discuss and criticise (to ‘control’) our frames with evidence, in 
the sense of patterns of relationships through time.
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2. SOM E CRITICA L CONSIDERATIONS
V orster (1984:111) has castigated conventional scholarship (which he calls trad i­
tional historical interpretation) for seeing the scope and function of context far too 
limited: for focusing on only part of the situational context. The way in which con­
text is usually employed in much of New T estam ent research seems to refer to his­
tory as a backdrop to the texts.
Why is it that history often seems to be utilised in such a facile way? O r why is 
historical understanding reduced to enum eration  of historical aspects which are 
usually considered to be clearcut ‘data’? Why are texts often considered to be inter- 
pretable in themselves, with context only being added later, or called in to  resolve 
difficult parts? In this section I identify three m etaphors (functioning as assump­
tions) that possibly contributed to the shape of New Testam ent scholarship.
2.1 History a s ‘backdrop’
In his discussion about the ‘stages’ of the interpretive process (as specifically related 
to the New Testam ent), Marshall (1977b:12) informs us that ‘[a] third stage in un ­
derstanding  is concerned with background. It m ay be useful to  know something  
about the geography...A knowledge of the...author of the G ospel and his intended 
audience will help us to appreciate the point of the story. Much of this can be found 
fairly simply from reference books’ (my italics).
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The underlying conception of historical context is obvious; It is something like a 
backdrop to an image, unproblem atic in itself, possibly useful for the ‘task of eluci­
dation’ (M arshall 1977a: 126). Historical ‘evidence’ (background studies) when used 
like a wood-worker uses nails, makes context into a mere step within the in terpre­
tive process, accorded a role that is rated anything from im portant, or even neces­
sary, to merely interesting and optional.
In the sam e volum e that M arshall contributed to, we find D rane’s (1977:117) 
statem ent: ‘It is...essential for the student of the New T estam ent to be thoroughly 
fam iliar with the background of religious thought against which it was w ritten’ (my 
italics). The New Testam ent is as much first century religious thought as other texts 
from the time. To think otherwise is to make silly distinctions, such as between the 
Old T estam ent and contem porary (first century) Judaism  (as D rane 1977:117-119 
does). Imagine M atthew’s (or Jesus’) surprise at being informed that they were not 
Jews but exponents of the Old Testament!
The whole idea of context as a fixed, determ inative background to which dis­
putes concerning meaning can appeal is misplaced. For example, where does one 
draw the line when delineating the context of a text? ‘Each text reflects the coloring 
of its context, and each context the coloring of its ring of contexts’ (Barnhart 1980: 
504). Context is just more text, just as much in need of in terpre tation  and in fact 
constituted by a sim ilar configuration of opaque factors that produced the am bi­
guities and concerns it is being called on to clarify. The appeal to context does not 
resolve controversy about meaning but shifts the research to a larger and more pro­
b lem atic area; it generates the search for the relevant context. While meaning is 
context-bound, context is boundless.
This is som ething lawyers know well; context is in principle infinitely 
expandable, lim ited only by their resourcefulness, their clients*^ re­
sources, and the patience of the judge. There is always more evidence 
tha t may bear in some way or ano ther on the m eaning of the act or 
w ords at issue...C ontext is often thought o f as a given, but lawyers 
know that it is produced, and that it is not saturable. Contextualiza- 
tion is never completed; rather one reaches a point where further con- 
textualixation seems unproductive.
(Culler 1988:148)
This forces one to  recognise that the interpreter actively brings to the text selective 
factors with which to designate contexts (and other texts) to the text (cf De Villiers 
1984:68).
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2.2 Communication as transmission
W hether explicitly, such as V orster (1977:18-23), or at a more general level, there 
exists widespread agreem ent that exegesis is about ‘letting the texts speak’, allowing 
the texts to ‘communicate’.
Problem s arise, not with this, but with the way that com m unication is concep­
tualised. Highly influential has been the linear. Sender -  Receiver model (or m eta­
phor). This is by far the most favoured model used to account for human communi­
cation. It goes back to Shannon & W eaver (1949 -  though, like m ost influential 
ideas, with roots going back much further according to Sperber & Wilson 1986:5-6) 
and becam e particularly widespread through the work of various scholars. A signi­
ficant motive in the developm ent and adoption of the model appears to be the fact 
that it was taken from electronic communication engineering in an effort to emulate 
the hard sciences. In this perspective, hum an com m unication is broken up into 
three domains, which however much qualified, remain separate. The success of the 
m etaphor witnesses to the fact that similarities exist, but it rem ains a metaphor.
Descriptions and analyses based on the source-channel-receiver model have not 
yielded sufficiently integrative explanations of com m unication. It is not so much 
wrong as inappropriate or insufficient. The metaphor creates an expectation and /o r 
a discourse of successful method. The interpreter must ‘overcom e’ various obstacles 
( ‘noise’, ‘in terference’) and solve problem s by using the right ‘m ethod’ or ‘instru­
m ents’. If you cannot understand the text, it is not because the au thor was an in­
com petent comm unicator; the fault is yours, because you have not invested enough 
intellectual labour/used the correct m ethod/applied a proper reading technique (cf 
M cGee 1990; G ouran 1985:108).
To study human communication we need something that differs from the engi­
n eer’s m easuring instrum ents (see the im portant discussion by Sless 1986:10-23). 
W hen studying ancient documents the researcher actually functions as both trans­
m itter and receiver within the communicative event. In o ther words, the transmis­
sion m etaphor deceives with regard to the active role that the interpreter plays when 
in terpreting , ‘creating’ the au thor and the aud ito r/aud ience . O ne does not first 
study the author, then the text and then the audience (or in any other order). One 
can only look at the audience with the help of the text -  a text construed by the in­
terpreter. We only have a text-author and a text-audience.
Viewing the world as a neutral space in which discrete entities (objects, beings 
etc) occasionally act or exert influence on one another is necessary in order to pic­
ture com m unication in term s of a linear sequence of events (X acts, Y reacts, X 
reacts to Y’s reaction and so forth). This picture o f neutral space within which we 
act facilitates the image of meaning that is encapsulated (translated) in stuff (ges­
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tures, sounds, objects) which can be untangled or decoded. But the researcher jud­
ges the perform ance(s) of the sender/receiver on the basis of one’s own understan­
ding of language and history. O ne does not en ter a neutral space, one is already 
part of the process, as much constructed and constructing as the other parties.
‘Transm ission of inform ation’ models usually make com m unication som ething 
clear and straightforward, ignoring or simplifying the inherent instability of human 
communication. They also often fail because of an underlying idea of disembodied 
information (which can somehow be extracted from the medium), and linear, causal 
models fail because they almost always omit the complexities and interrelatedness 
of the many communicative elem ents which are most crucial for understanding hu­
man behaviour.
2 3  Meaning as system
The w idespread influence of Saussure in linguistics and literary  theories is well 
known, and also well deserved. Yet, the tendency of researchers to present contro­
versial ideas w ithout critical discussion crea tes m ore havoc than  illum ination . 
Saussure has form ulated , am ongst o thers, some ra ther lim ited and vague ideas, 
generating a wealth of debate, but often with only a superficial understanding of the 
problem s (Saussure 1974; cf Culler 1976; Sless 1986:132-145; Coward & Ellis 1981: 
162-164). O ne particular concept has led to misconception, namely that meaning is 
related to sharing in a system.
‘Language exists in the form of a sum of impressions deposited in the brain of 
each m em ber of a community, alm ost like a dictionary of which identical copies 
have been distributed to each individual. Language exists in each individual, yet it is 
common to ail’ (Saussure 1974:19). This fundam ental assumption has become very 
powerful.
Following Saussure and others who have emphasised the shared aspect of lang­
uages (m eaning as system  to refer to the collective nature of language) there has 
been a tendency to gloss over the breaks, fissures and chasms which characterise the 
in frastructure of understanding in favour o f holistic (read  monistic) approaches. 
T hese approaches examine the nature o f understanding and texts with constructs 
such as ‘linguistic com petence’, the ‘logic of culture’ or ‘discursive practices’ -  in 
short The System  which answers all questions. The practical correlation of this as­
sumption is that human action can be explained by reference to laws and initial con­
ditions, by ‘discovering’ independent unvariables; or by exposing essences (‘deep’ 
structures).
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Two im portant notions must consequently be emphasised. Firstly, that commu­
nication is a very, very complex thing.
C om m unication as sharing looks backward to a rom antic notion of 
comm unity that we can never recapture, even assuming that it ever 
existed; the curse of Babel has probably always been there, waiting in 
the wings to overwhelm us at any moment with confusion and misun­
derstanding. Transm ission as a concept o f com m unication is firmly 
rooted in the ideology of imperialism. Once we question the authority 
of the imperialist we must also question the validity of his intellectual 
postures.
(Sless 1986:23)
Com m unication also generates m isunderstanding and conflict, and must be regar­
ded as an ongoing problematic rather than as an integrated and homogeneous entity. 
Novelty and deviation are as much a part of the communicative contexts of human 
life as are routine and the taken-for-granted procedures through which coordinated 
human behaviour is accomplished.
Secondly, in place of a search for laws and independent essentials there should 
be a careful investigation of the situation in which an action (communicative event) 
was performed. Just as shapes or figures are similar or different depending on their 
ground or context, so meanings, events, acts, people and their ideas can only be 
similar or different in relationship to a background (see Baker & H acker 1980:258- 
283). ‘M eaning’ is not a private, subjective entity, but is created by the use of ex­
pressions in social interaction: Only an analysis of the context of human action can 
give insight into both its determ inants and its meaning. ‘T hat is, without the his­
torical dim ension, which provides the context of a communicative act, the meaning 
of a communicative act cannot be fully or truly understood’ (M ander 1983:11).
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3. SOME DISllNCTIONS
Thinking about context clearly demands some distinctions, and one frequently finds 
the distinction between micro and macro context. Noting the distinction between 
the subpart of the universe of discourse as context of an utterance and the discourse 
shared, though often helpful, should not disguise the relationships and interrelation­
ships of aspects designated micro context. Thus, not only should the distinction be 
refined, but one should ask about the connections between facets of a supposed con­
text, how they ‘change’ when ‘moved’ from macro to micro level, and how aspects 
mutually define and determ ine each other. In attem pting to remain aware of these 
difficulties, f suggest distinguishing between setting, environment and encyclopaedic
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or them atic knowledge. I will also add some remarks about how it may be possible 
to do this sort of thing realistically and fairly.
No doubt should exist as to the fact that these ‘fea tu res’ describe m ore than 
m ere parts o f a  process; they are aspects with substantiality in themselves, yet irre­
trievably interwoven with each other. Thus, the idea is not to create the impression 
that contextualising is like assembling, building by taking blocks from the one ‘level’ 
for constructing  the o ther. T here is an extensive interplay betw een the various 
‘levels’, these distinctions are made for argum ent’s sake.
The point I am trying to make has to do with the phenom enon that context is 
often reduced to disconnected details. To counter this, the emphasis is on the impor­
tance of working with background aspects themselves in o rder to  get a feeling for 
the interwovenness of data selected for a context; not only interconnected, but rela­
ted to the environment in strange and unexpected ways. The dynamic side to the as­
pects selected for a constructed setting can be illustrated with reference to orality 
and literacy in antiquity. Notions like texts, tradition and even writing derive their 
m eaning from  the norm ative cultural values w ithin which they occur. W hen it 
comes to New Testam ent documents we should not only beware of our literate bias 
and assumptions about communication implying inherent, constant and unchanging 
qualities, or, put differently, imputing contem porary notions to historical concepts, 
but should also relate our selected aspects to others; Talking about transmission of 
traditions is also talking about ancient education, ancient literacy and ancient story­
telling (A chtem eier 1990; Botha 1990, 1992a).
3.1 Setting
With the term  ‘setting’ the idea is to refer to context in the sense of aciuat, relevant 
frame. It can be argued, in principle, that ‘the proper context of anything written is 
everything w ritten’. But when a text is being understood, ‘its actual context is much 
more narrow and far less textual than that. It is a fusion of the relevant segments of 
the reader’s and the text’s respective horizons, that is to say, a fusion of as much of 
the reader’s intersubjective lifeworld with as much of the text’s intertextual context 
as becom es subjectivley mobilized in a particu lar reading experience’ (M ernadi 
1988:751).
In practice only a finite and discrete set of cultural ‘im peratives’ need to be 
treated as implicatives within a specific discourse.
W hen describing a context it is im portant to bear in mind that context presup­
poses ‘a statem ent of the inner logic, the interior structure, of the thing subject to 
interpretation’ (Neusner 1986:ix). After all, the major clues to the context of a text
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arise from interaction with the text itself. The construai of the text should proceed 
pari passu with the construction of its context (Seung 1980:91). Taking a cue from 
Dundes (1964), I have elsewhere illustrated how the ‘texture’, the linguistic struc­
tures, of M ark’s gospel, a reading of the text and a possible historical setting for the 
gospel interact and interrelate: Mark is a dram atic story narrated in a style not un­
like oral-formulaic composition by an itinerant ‘teacher’ (Botha 1991, 1992b).
3.2 Them atic knowledge (or; comprehensive narratives)
A major quality o f an in terpreter is a store of historical knowledge -  knowledge of 
the events, beliefs and values making up cultures and periods. O ne does not be­
come an in terp re ter by merely learning a method; scholarship and sensitivity, wide 
reading and membership of a critical culture (community) are called for.
A wide variety of information in memory is needed to understand even simple 
events in the world. This knowledge cannot be stored in memory as a random col­
lection of isolated facts. If we are to be able to access and apply this general know­
ledge to new events, it must be organised functionally in memory. T hat is, the 
knowledge must be organised in memory so as to activate related information that 
may be useful, motivate inferences to fill in information not explicitly stated, provide 
expectations about what may occur next, and call to mind previously understood epi­
sodes that contain similar information.
The.se types of activities are basically the same when ‘scientifically’ interpreting 
ancient texts. W hat is different is the explicit intensification of awareness and argu­
ment called for. This is when the formal use of concise models and intense involve­
m ent with interdisciplinary research are of the utm ost im portance (on these issues 
see Barton 1982:13-14; Elliott 1986; White 1986; Rohrbaugh 1987).
Themes, events, actions and so forth in the narrative/text to be interpreted can 
typically only be causally explained and the pieces of the story connected together to 
form a coherent whole with additional knowledge about them, so that it is obvious 
that one needs packages of them atic knowledge, or what Sperber & Wilson (1986: 
236) call ‘encyclopaedic schem as’ or ‘encyclopaedic en trie s’ (S perber & Wilson 
1986:87-89). This type of knowledge is relatively abstract, and is developed from 
many other settings involving other particular goals and actions. It provides connec­
tions betw een story elem ents and connections to related  inform ation in memory. 
This process o f drawing on re la ted  knowledge to add to explicit inform ation, to 
make inferences, is vital to com prehending both textual m aterial and natural expe­
riences.
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Such ‘packages’ of historical knowledge are usually organised in narrative form: 
For example the conventional concept of Hellenism  has as plot the movement and 
success o f ‘G reek  cultu re’ (particularly G reek language) and contains characters 
such as Alexander the G reat.
Adopting terminology from G oldstein’s discussion of the philosophy of history 
(G oldstein 1976:140-143), we can distinguish between the infra- and superstructures 
of these ‘narratives’. The superstructure refers to the various packages of them atic 
knowledge, the ‘visible’ results of historical work. The infrastructure of a ‘bundle’ of 
historical knowledge refers to the models and techniques employed by the historian 
in the course of the production of the superstructure, from the first acquaintance 
with the h istorical da ta  to the end result. The reason for alluding to infra- and 
superstructure is to emphasise the connection between them.
R eturn ing  to our exam ple, H ellenism , we note that the conventional super­
structure follows from a political infrastructure, combined with a ‘great m an’ con­
cept of history. W orking with a religiously and sociologically determ ined infra­
structure would lead one to characterise Hellenism by a distinctive worldview and 
cosmology (scientific -  for the time -  and fatalistic), the developm ent of a distinctive 
monarchically based socio-economic system and a particular attitude towards wri­
ting and literacy (on these issues see Jones 1964; M artin 1987:6-12; Ulansey 1989: 
46-94, 125; Lentz 1989). O ur perception of the widespread value of the G reek lang­
uage is probably overrated (MacMullen 1990; Harris 1989:175-190).
33  Environment
O ne can imagine a sort of interm ediate level between one’s ‘encyclopaedic entries’ 
and the text setting: contextual effects and information at the level of what could be 
relevant and what the sphere of reference should be.
33.1 Normal pragmatic context (the to be expected)
Guessing the setting of a communicative event is in a sense .saying something about 
what one considers to be usual or normal for such a supposed situation. A concept 
of a situation and a perception of normality of perform ance in such a situation are 
inseparable in a pragm atic sense; one cannot be determ ined without determ ining 
the other at the same time. Thus, thinking about a setting involves reflection about 
an ideal setting. It is this normality of the pragmatic context that serves as the fun­
dam ental prem ise in our inferential knowledge of the speaker’s or au thor’s inten­
tion, or construction of meaning (Seung 1980).
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The norm ality of the pragm atic context is always culture bound; both what is 
and what is not normal in the perform ance of speech acts and their situations, are 
determ ined by the conventions of culture. The recognition of pragmatic contexts al­
ways depends on our knowledge of historio-cultural contexts. Such a recognition de­
pends on a description of socio-cultural conventions.
3.3.2 Description (what was it like?)
The spectres of m isapprehension and mystification haunt the in terpre ter unrelen­
tingly. One can only exorcise them with an attem pt at authentic description (Runci- 
man 1983:223-300). Now, it is very difficult to say what is authentic, although the 
basic idea is obvious: Our descriptions should also be valid for those we are describ­
ing.
The o ften  voiced despair at such an en terprise  reflects an illegitim ate con­
ception of ‘telling it "from the native’s point of view"’. In seeking to uncover such a 
perspective, G eertz (1983:69-70) counsels us to
oscillate restlessly between the sort of exotic m inutiae (lexical anti­
theses, categorical schemes, morpho-phonemic transform ations) that 
make even the best ethnographies a trial to read and the sort of swee­
ping characterizations...that make all but the most pedestrian of them 
som ewhat implausible. H opping back and forth betw een the whole 
conceived through the parts that actualize it and the parts conceived 
through the whole that motivates them, we seek to turn them, by sort 
of intellectual perpetual motion, into explications of one another.
In short, accounts of o ther peoples’ subjectivities can be built up 
w ithout recourse to pretensions to m ore-than-norm al capacities for 
ego effacem ent and fellow feeling. N orm al capacities in these re­
spects are , of course, essential, as is the ir cultivation, if we expect 
people to tolerate our intrusions into their lives at all and accept us as 
persons worth talking to.
A well-known example of what difference the authentic-for-them principle makes, is 
the description of first century Judaism . Sanders (1977:33-238) in particular, has 
done im portant work on how many New Testam ent scholars simply distorted rabbi­
nic Judaism to suit their own purposes, without an effort to understand it on its own 
terms. A similar manifestation can be detected in descriptions of em peror worship, 
which is usually characterised, with a stunning disregard for the ancients’ sincere re­
ligious intentions, as political exploitation (Botha 1989).
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W orking with ancient docum ents necessarily implies that any misapprehension 
or mystification in a source can only be corrected in the light of other sources. This 
makes it more complex, but not necessarily more difficult than interpretive descrip­
tions involving contem poraries. Sins (to  be avoided of course) in such an activity 
are: incom pleteness, oversimplification and ahistoricity; suppression, exaggeration 
and ethnocentricity.
333 Picturing the function of socio-cultural knowledge
W hen one is considering the usefulness an d /o r validity of components of a possible 
context, it helps to visualise how one’s socio-cultural and historical knowledge func­
tions.
1 think one’s contextual knowledge can function in one or more of the following 
ways. It can be seen as ‘codes’ constraining content and form, and .specifying rules 
for the particular event, genre, program, etcetera. Or, it can be pictured to function 
like scripts (or schemata). This way the participants are seen as actors ‘acting’ out a 
script. O ne is then in effect describing underlying expectations. Also, contextual 
m atters can be .seen as strategies for associating knowledge: cues for relating texts, 
events and artifacts to each other.
One endeavours to define the way one uses historical knowledge in o rder to 
gain a sense of realism . It also helps one to be careful: We need to look at how 
choices are determ ined in and by particular situations. Often, as individuals, people 
comm unicate in ways not constrained by their cultural backgrounds. Interaction is 
always ‘em ergent’, that is, comm unicative strategies are negotiated am ong parti­
cipants and seldom a copy of the normal pragmatic context.
4. SOME CONSTRUCTIVE CONSIDERATIONS
4.1 The communicative event as the aim of interpretation
Among the m onum ental consequences of Einstein’s theory of relativity is a funda­
mentally profound truth regarding communication and knowledge. By dem onstra­
ting the interactive effects between the observer and observed, making final m ea­
surem ents problematic, Einstein opened the way to a theory of intersubjective con­
stitution of time-consciousness (Joas 1985:172-198; cf Einstein 1973:290-323, 341- 
356, 360-377). Less ponderously put, his work allows the insight tha t reality is 
always encased in a communicative matrix. Consequently, com m unication indeed 
encompasses everything that is human. Such grand scale thoughts aside, what is dif­
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feren t from two rocks next to each o ther and two humans within a relationship is 
that humans communicate.
This is a basic stance not without consequences. The focus moves from texts as 
such (as if they could be objects in them selves) to the com m unication events of 
which texts are part. Usually, this means a focus on the people in, around, behind 
and created by texts. Such a focus is also pragmatic.
Pragm atist philosophy and theory attacks reductionist and dualistic ontologies 
and epistemologies. It utilises the concept of coordination: Human behaviour is on­
going, interconnected activities, which involves divisions o f labour and functioning 
factors within a vast complex. Communication always depends on processes of refe­
rence and the circumstances of experience. It is in and through communication that 
human societies are created and maintained. Communication and the processing of 
inform ation are not merely ‘aspects’ of human societies; rather, societies would be 
totally im possible w ithout com m unication in one form or ano ther (G oody 1973; 
Maines 1984).
The challenges I have in mind arise from W estern culture’s general abandon­
ment of uncritical positivism as philosophy, from the comprehensive nature of our 
in terests as expressed in key term s like com m unication  and rhetoric, and from a 
growing distrust of linear, mechanical conceptions of communication.
The single, most pressing challenge is to find ways of understanding and study­
ing human communication as a highly complex, transactional process. Far too little 
of our research views ‘all parties to a persuasive transaction as changeable and inter­
active ra ther than conceiving of persuasion as a process whereby the persuader(s) 
act and the targets react’ (M iller, Burgoon & Burgoon 1984:456). Interpretive stu­
dies must reflect on the ways in which all classes of variables affecting group proces­
ses are interconnected. Human communication must be conceptualised as interplay 
of forces with variable consequences for different, individual, situated persons, and 
those problem s call for re-examination of some basic concepts used in our scholar­
ship. Com m unication is not so much like a transaction, but more like ‘behavioral 
management of co-presence’ (cf Ciolek 1986:49; Arnold & Frandsen 1984).
P JJ Botha
4.2 Inside
When studying comm unication there is no vantage point from which all things are 
visible. This contrasts with the electronic transmission m etaphor which locates the 
researcher outside like an objective, all-seeing observer (cf the diagram by Lategan 
1984:3). R esearchers are like the figures in a landscape: We can see only what is 
before us and must imagine what is hidden from view. Though we can and do share
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discourses, our position in the ‘landscape’ (that is, the notions we are  develop­
ing/have about the text) determ ines what we see.
This realisation provides us with a powerful critical facility. O ne realises that all 
in terpretation  is man-made, and can be criticised and improved. One also realises 
that it is imperative to see oneself as within history, part of the very processes one is 
trying to understand.
We are part of our interpretations: Changing the signs themselves and bringing 
new signs into existence. One is not looking upon the works of others, but is part of 
the communication with the very thing one wants to scrutinise. In connection to this 
G eertz (1983:16) provides a valuable reminder:
To see ourselves as others see us can be eye-opening. To see others 
as sharing a nature with ourselves is the m erest decency. But it is 
from the far more difficult achievement of seeing ourselves amongst 
others, as a local example of the forms human life has locally taken, a 
case among cases, a world among worlds, that the largene.ss of mind, 
w ithout which objectivity is self-congratulation and tolerance a sham, 
comes.
4 3  Beware of ‘the method’
Critics such as Stout (1982, 1986), Fish (1980:147-173; 1985), K napp & Michaels 
(1982, 1983, 1989) and particularly Rorty (1982, 1985) have convinced me to give up 
on the quest for basic ground rules of rationality or criteria for public discourse as 
such. There is no ultim ate perspective and consequently no true, final method. In­
stead, as have been eloquently argued by many, we should cultivate a pragm atic ap­
proach.
Clearly, theoretical reflection is important. It can and does throw light on prac­
tice, in the sense of contributing to self-consciousness about definitions, categories 
and boundaries (Lentricchia 1985). But there is no project that can govern in ter­
p re ta tions of particu lar texts by appealing to an account o f (all and any) in te r­
pretation  in general. W hat we do have are rules of thumb, so to speak. Rules of 
thum b cannot be form alised because the conditions of their application vary with 
the circumstances of the ongoing practices of interpretation; as those circumstances 
change, the very meaning of the rules (the instructions they are understood to give) 
changes too.
Any attem pt to formulate a comprehensive method in the sense of a device that 
will replicate operations and results (like m athem atical theory: formal, abstract, 
general, invariant) has always failed and will never be successful. An example of
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such a m ethod is the goal of Chomskian theory: the construction of ‘a system of 
rules that in some explicit and well-defined way assigns structural descriptions to 
sentences’, where ‘explicit’ means mechanical (like an algorithm) and the assigning 
is done not by the interpreter but by the system (Chomsky 1965:8). Theoretical re­
flection in this sense strives for the impossible. It will never succeed simply because 
the data and the formal ‘laws’ necessary to its success will always be developed from 
within the context o f which they are supposedly independent. As Rorty (1982:162) 
puts it, ‘[t]here are no essences anywhere in the area. There is no wholesale, episte- 
mological way to direct, or criticize or underwrite the course of inquiry...It is the vo­
cabulary of practice rather than of theory...in which one can say som ething useful 
about truth.’
One should be a pragmatist. The interesting fact is that when it comes to inter­
pretation we are, in any case, pragmatic. W hatever positions people think they hold 
on language, interpretation, and belief, in practice we are all pragmatists. We all 
think language is intentional, and we all think our beliefs are true. In scientific con­
jecture, we may distinguish between speech acts and language, between having be­
liefs and claiming to know, between having true beliefs and really knowing. We do 
not practice such distinctions. Yes, a text can be anything that we want to make it. 
But we never make it everything, we unceasingly make it something, and that som e­
thing is always something detenninate but never anything final. A  text can be a lot of 
things, but not at the same time; final meaning is always deferred, but determ inate 
meaning is not (cf Wasiolek 1983:140).
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4.4 Texts
The discussion in this section is prom pted by the well-known adage that New Testa­
ment science is (or should be) a text-centred science (cf J E  B otha 1991a:278) -  
which simply raises the question: What is a text?
A text is a state of potentiality, and acquires reality in the coasciousness of the 
addresser/addressee. The ‘document’ (as physical object or sound) may be an arti­
fact, but strictly speaking the text is not. An object ‘becomes’ a text when imagined 
as the means of expression for all the actions, relationships and connections that dis­
course m ediates (cf Fowler 1986:86). ‘Texte sind nicht i.solierte GroBen, sondern 
sind in einen groBeren Z usam m enhang eingebe tte t’ (Egger 1987:34; De Villiers 
1984:66). W hatever is created by an author (the w riter/speaker) is not the whole 
being of the text. Nothing is possible w ithout the pre-existing discourse which is 
rooted in social, economic, political and ideological conditions. C om prehension 
does not proceed from straightforward analysis of linguistic structure. A text is part
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of a complexly structured process or event; its structural form, by social semiotic p ro­
cedures, constitutes a representation of a world, characterised by activities and sta­
tes and values. O utside a comm unicative event (in which it is crea ted /fic tionali­
sed /p ro jec ted  for sure) a text is a m ere artifact. A text is a comm unicative in ter­
action betw een its producer and its consumers, within relevant social and institutio­
nal contexts (cf Fowler 1986; De Beaugrande & Dressier 1981). To adopt the very 
descriptive dictum of Lotm an (1990:63-64), a text is a meaning-generating m echa­
nism in a relationship of mutual activation with its readership (cf Lotman 1990:11- 
111).
Philology, traditionally the text-centred study of language, as contrasted to ling­
uistics, which is speech-centred, has of course been concerned with making ancient 
or recondite documents accessible to those for whom they are ancient or foreign or 
esoteric. Term s are glossed, notes appended, com m entaries w ritten, and, where 
necessary, transcriptions m ade and translations produced in o rder to produce an 
annotated, readable ‘re-presentation’ of the text.
Leaving out o f the picture the practical difficulties (which as we all know are 
not inconsiderable), this ‘picture’ of interpretation seems fairly clear and acceptable. 
However, as G eertz  has noted, when philological concern goes beyond routinised 
craft procedures (authen tication , reconstruction, anno ta tion ) to  address itself to 
conceptual questions concerning the nature of texts as such -  that is, to questions 
about their principles of construction, the why, how, and what for -  simplicity flees.
The result is a shattering of philology, itself by now a near obsolescent 
term, into disjunct and rivalrous specialties, and most particularly the 
growth of a division between those who study individual texts (histo­
rians, literary critics) and those who study the activity of creating texts 
in general (linguists, psychologists, ethnographers). The study of in­
scriptions is severed from the study of inscribing, the study of fixed 
meaning is severed from the study of the social processes that fix it.
The result is a double narrowness. Not only is the extension of text 
analysis to nonwritten m aterials blocked, but so is the application of 
sociological analysis to written ones.
(G eertz 1983:31)
The repair of this split and the integration of the study of how texts as part of a pro­
cess is built into the social phenom ena are what various interdisciplinary enterprises 
a ttem p t to  do, and w hat I would like to  see New T estam en t scholars take very 
seriously. The need is for extensive and critical working knowledge of a very wide 
ranging spectrum of interests in the contextual web. A mere reading of texts (even
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of most of them , were one endowed with superhum an skills and energy), or collec­
ting of ‘facts’ is not yet contextualising, nor understanding.
O ne cannot oppose text to context, or reduce text to a function of context, nor 
see a text as something caused by context. In this regard 1 found Barthes’ discussion 
concerning myths as signs helpful (Barthes 1973:120-138 -  Barthes is not addressing 
the issue of text and context as such). We tend to think of the relationship between 
context and text as one of ‘equality’. But the relationship is one of ‘equivalence’. 
W hat we need to grasp in the relationship is not the sequential ordering whereby 
one concept causes the other (the citing of parallels), but the interrelatedness which 
unites them and makes the text and the context what they are.
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4.5 A semiotic perspective
W hat 1 want to emphasise in this section is ‘the proposal that cultural phenom ena 
should be tre a te d  as significative systems posing expositive questions’ (G eertz  
1983:3). This proposal can be described as a semiotic perspective.
It must be stressed that this proposal concerns a point o f view, not a method, 
but a way of looking at things. The work of Barthes (1973), in particular, deserves 
to be m entioned as an example o f a sem iotic perspective. Published originally in 
1957, Mythologies has been one of the most influential texts determining the study of 
culture. It is an evocative work; a collection which, for the most, consists of critical 
review articles exploring the meaning of representations or things of popular culture 
in France. Barthes offers readings of ‘texts’ such as wrestling, soap-powders, m ar­
garine, cars and news photographs and dem onstrates that these texts can be used to 
conjure up a world o f myth and paradox and give unexpected com prehension of 
human activities.
Looking at words, things and events as standing-for can yield a rich harvest of 
understanding and insight. Semiotics is concerned with relations: how, when one 
statem ent is made, others are necessarily implied.
4.6 The ‘problem’ of subjectivity
Clearly, when working with dated texts, with persons long dead, we are engaging in a 
hypothetical and imaginative construction when we ‘com m unicate’. In a very real 
sense we have nothing but silent documents, apparently forcing us into a vicious cir­
cle. The fact that in terpretation/understanding takes place at all points to the role 
stereotyped knowledge plays. ‘W hen reading a text, people utilize their prior know­
ledge of the subject m atter covered in the text' (Abbot, Black & Smith 1985:179) -  a
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phenom enon that is philosophically described by the concept Vorverstandnis. The 
existence of a p reunderstand ing  does not ‘m ake the d ialogue dogm atic, for in 
genuine dialogue preunderstanding can be brought to consciousness and checked 
against its ramifications in terms of the subject m atter itself (Hoy 1978:77). But this 
is to move the problem only one step backward as one must still determ ine what the 
subject m atter at stake is, against which one can test the preunderstandings. How­
ever, for a large part, the subject m atter of a text is a practical affair, concerning 
genre, structure, questions addressed and created by the text, eliminating irrelevant 
cultural references, constructing arguments for one’s choices and so forth.
Yet, this is where at least two theoretical issues concerning one’s approach to a 
text should be enum erated.
The first is a consent to self-censure (which we all share, at least in theory). We 
do need preunderstanding, presuppositions and assumptions to understand at all; 
that is not the issue. The problem is to critically relate to our assumptions. Serious 
and consistent historical work is clearly needed, but also about one’s own position, 
perspectives and aims. ‘Self-reflection and a clearer self-understanding are critical 
if the interpretive process is to realize its essential possibilities...In order to under­
stand the past, it is necessary to try to understand one’s own presuppositions and 
prejudgm ents in o rder to realize how these m ediate one’s perception of the past’ 
(Hoy 1977:viii, 94).
In short, the circular activity of one’s reasoning seems vicious only
...when we forget how often...assumptions and the background beliefs 
that engender them  undergo change in response to the interpretive 
process itself... We move from part to whole and back again, adjusting 
prelim inary expectations and background beliefs as we go along to 
m ake the explanatory  problem  easier. The fact tha t this process 
som etim es leads us to abandon attitudes about ourselves and our 
world we would otherwise never think to question -  and would not 
even think to include at the outset in a list of relevant background as­
sumptions -  shows that the hermeneutical circle...is a helix.
(Stout 1986:106; Barnhart 1980:510-511)
Secondly, the basic thing about interpretation is a com m itm ent to not making the 
text into a mirror, or falling into ventriloquism. True in terpretation  concerns the 
fundam ental acceptance of the possibility of the differentness of ano ther’s m ean­
ings: Someone else speaks. We should extend this ethical commitment to dem ocra­
tic values to a basic stance, making it a habit, or better still, a culture. ‘This is to be 
open to encounters with other actual and possible cultures, and to make this open­
ness central to its self-image. This culture is an ethnos which prides itself on its sus-
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picion of ethnocentrism -  on its ability to increase the freedom and openness of en­
counters, rather than on its possession of truth’ (Rorty 1991:2).
A basic sequel concerning historical activity follows: acknowledging that the 
past is a different country -  to adapt the famous adage with which a novel by H art­
ley (1963:9) opens: ‘The past is a foreign country: they do things differently there’ (cf 
also Lowenthal 1985:28-34, 410-412). ‘Historical study takes an interest in what is 
really new -  that is, in what is unlike ourselves’ (Hirsch 1985:196).
The study of history (or historical activity) is not a possibility o r condition for 
arriving at som ething (e g self-clarification), but is a fact, som ething going on any 
way. This is of course not a very useful remark, but at least it serves to raise the (ra­
ther im portant) question that what is really at stake can only be how it (history) can 
be meaningful and truthful.
The gehildeten Verachteren of history and historical understanding will be quick 
to point out that I am connecting two positions that (some would like to claim) are 
in opposition, namely emphasis on the cognitive apriori and the priority of historical 
in terpre tation . Underlying my exposition is the conviction that the fam ous sub­
jective-objective polarity is a plague that needs to be eradicated from our discourses. 
The dichotomy: either ahisiorical unchanging canons of rationality or cultural relati­
vism is a dichotomy only when one adheres to a ‘copy’ theory of truth, ‘the concep­
tion according to which a statem ent is true just in case it "corresponds to the [mind 
independent] facts"’ (Putnam  1981:ix). There is an extremely close connection be­
tween the notions of truth, rationality and values; between ‘objectivity’ and one’s his­
toricity, not a cancellation of one by the o ther (on these issues see Bernstein 1983; 
Putnam 1981:103-216; Raval 1986:121, 103; Hernadi 1988:752).
The realisation  that we are fully and com pletely enclosed by our history and 
that all our knowledge is m ediated knowledge is a challenge: ‘O ur intellect and 
understanding are bounded only by the limits of the structures we can invent, and... 
any limitation of intellect is a limitation of inventiveness...Whatever limits there are 
to human im agination would seem to be those we have placed on ourselves by cul­
ture, training, and experience. We live by the learned images and the myths in our 
heads’ (Cooper 1980:14-15).
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5. F -R A M IN G IH E  TKXT
5.1 Dynamic framing versus static context
What I have been working up to should be fairly clear by now. Interpretation is con- 
textualising. Talking about a text is talking about its context, and the context-text 
continuum is a m atter of imaginative construction.
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The notion of ‘context’ should not be pictured as something in itself. Such a dis­
tinction  oversim plifies ra th e r than enhances critical and interpretive discussion, 
since the opposition between an act/event and its context seems to presume that the 
context is given and determ ines the meaning of the text/event. Context ‘is not fun­
damentally different from what it contextualises; context is not given but produced; 
w hat belongs to a context is determ ined by interpretive strategies; contexts are just 
as much in need of elucidation as events; and the m eaning of a context is d e te r­
mined by events’ (Culler 1988:ix).
As C uller warns, we should beware of the (implied) suggestion of most uses of 
the term  context: a suggestion of it being something static, real and to be discovered. 
Criticism (in the sense of striving for understanding) deals with how signs are consti­
tuted (fram ed) by various di.scursive practices, institutional arrangements, systems of 
value, and semiotic mechanisms.
The expression framing the sign has several advantages over context: it 
rem inds us that framing is something we do; it hints o f the frame-up 
( ‘falsifying evidence beforehand in order to make som eone appear 
guilty’), a major use of context; and it eludes the incipient positivism 
of ‘context’ by alluding to the sem iotic function of fram ing in art... 
Although analysis can seldom live up to the complexities of framing 
and falls back into discussion of context, with its heuristically simpli­
fying presum ptions, let us at least keep before us the notion of fra­
ming -  as a frame for these discussions.
(Culler 1988:ix)
Adopting the notion of framing helps us to express the underlying relevance of our 
interpretive activities.
5.2 Relevance
Describing interpretations as mapping of texts into language, Stout (1986:103) notes 
that
not just any sort of text-mapping would ordinarily count as in terp re­
tation . U tterly  arb itrary , pointless mappings would not. This sug­
gests...that even bad in terpre tations can be recognized as interpeta- 
tions only relative to interests and purposes of some sort -  relative to 
som ething that would give them interest and point...abstracting from 
interest and purpose altogether produces mappings that are good for 
nothing.
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Stout (1986:115; cf also Raval 1986:125-126) continues by asking what the goodness 
(in the sense of truthfulness, validity, etc) of an inteipretation is relative to. Clearly, 
the answer is the interests, purposes, and background beliefs of interpreters. ‘The 
idea is to keep the various purposes of interpretive practice in view, not to propose 
maximizing utility (or anything else, for that m atter) as a purpose for every oc­
casion.’
Because we are part of the contextualising enterprise, because cognition p re­
supposes the principle of relevance, we are forced to confront ourselves. The ideal 
to be historical, to let others speak -  like all other interpretive ideals -  turns back on 
us. T here is a whiplash to our in terpretations in the sense that our results ask to 
what interests and purposes our efforts are relevant. O ne’s ethics, desires and atti­
tude to o ther persons and mankind in general are, in o ther words, entwined with 
one’s interpretive strategies, one’s framings.
Consequently, we should move beyond a naive quest for the meaning of a text, 
or the dispute about the right method, towards a struggle over what makes these 
texts worth caring about and what kind of society to strive for. These m atters deter­
mine our interpretive purposes and aims. If we do not want hierarchical, au tho­
ritarian societies engaging in violence and psychological terrorism (a device that the 
church likes to resort to -  Cupitt 1985:48-121), nor want to raid texts in o rder to 
confirm an irrelevant metaphysics, we have already made im portant decisions with 
regard to ‘m ethod’ and interpretive aims. Having chosen for an open, ‘dem ocratic’ 
society (this must not be taken in a cheap, count-the-votes sense -  see Rorty 1989, 
1990), the need for historical, contextual interpretation is emphasised.
A striving to let those authors really say what they intended is a criterium made 
relevant, amongst many other reasons, by my own context, where so many people 
have been abused. O f course, a different context and o ther aims could change the 
relevant criteria determining a good/proper interpretation and normative aims. Be 
that as it may, at issue is that our ethical and political conceptions are part of that 
which we bring to the text, and interpretation, if we want it to be any good, forces 
those attitudes into our methodologies and aims. Explicitness about relevance ne­
cessarily asks for discussion and criticism of our interests, purposes and ideals.
6. SUMMARY
New Testam ent research is a multi-faceted and complex discipline. It is a historical 
d iscip line, in a com prehensive sense, concerned  with the social, psychological, 
experiential and religious m atters of the people and their activities that started  
Christianity.
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O ur interpretations of their ventures and comm unications should dem onstrate 
tha t to re fe r to  the social and contextual use of w ords is not to simplify in te r­
pretation  or to cut down ambiguity. In current critical debates, invocation of the 
social character of texts and of the need for reference to context often turn out to be 
a reductive move, based on the assumption that contextual determ ination will in fact 
produce final meaning. Recour.se to social attitudes and usage, or to authorial in­
tentions, or to underlying cultural scripts or codes, simply gives access to that which 
in them selves are divided and multi-layered and generate m ore complex explana­
tions and realistic perceptions.
History opens complexities rather than narrowing down to univocal meanings. 
O ne cannot oppose text to context, as if context were som ething other than more 
text. Context is in itself just as complex and in need of interpretation. Reference to 
social usage does not end exploration of meaning, it is initiated by such reference.
W hat 1 have been trying to say is that background studies are not for filling in 
missing parts-of the puzzle. Interpretation is to engage in communication, and com­
m unication is an immensely complex and involved process. Instead of using the 
m etaphor of transmission (or a derivative) I would suggest the m etaphor o f -dyou- 
are-now-here-map. It effectively acknowledges that the researcher is inside the pro­
cess, that one has a point of view (for instance, now looking at author-text, then at 
reader-text, etc) that is lim ited according to various factors, and one has to shift 
point of view to change these limits. It also emphasises that one is feeling one’s way, 
exploring, looking from the inside, so to speak, instead of knowing and looking at 
everything from above.
‘To speak of the meaning of the work is to tell a story of reading’ (Culler 1982; 
35). O r, in my context, making a map about where one was and how one got to 
w here one now happens to be. Most emphatically, I do not want to claim a new 
m ethod, but ra ther to extricate our interpretive activities from an obsession with 
m ethod. Instead of asking about the right method, or objective results, it is main­
tained that the question of attitudes (such as a democratic comm itment) determines 
methods and relevance of interpretation. Consequently, less negative and insulting 
activities, but more serious straining towards true contextual understanding. A criti­
cal community is better than a knowing one. A critical community with good m an­
ners b e tte r  still. And, the best of worlds would be one tha t is also historically 
minded.
I have provided an argum ent for an e labora te  and complex interweaving of 
questions and possible explanations concerning texts and their contexts which sees 
influences bouncing back and forth in intricate and unpredictable patterns.
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Consider the previous sentence; It is a rather nice example of academ ic formu­
lation. What does it really say? Not much: It says one does not know how events 
and texts affect another; they do, but we -  or at least I -  have not been able to figure 
out exactly how or exactly why. To do so, is of course to transcend humanity: vain 
and dangerous. O urs is to try, to attem pt understanding and explanation: creating 
our own texts through which we live our lives. Historical enquiry is the force which 
assists both understanding and self-understanding.
P J J  Botha
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